We analyze newly available data from the Health and Retirement Study on senior citizens' take-up of Medicare Part D and the associated SSA Low-Income Subsidy. We find that economic factors -specifically, demand for prescription drugs -drove the decision to enroll in Part D.
Introduction
The new Medicare prescription drug benefit, commonly referred to as "Part D," began in January 2006. Unlike Medicare Parts A and B, takeup of which is close to universal among eligible individuals as a result of essentially automatic enrollment, Part D requires most beneficiaries to make an active choice about whether or not to participate. Beneficiaries who want to enroll in Part D must choose a prescription drug insurance plan and, in most cases, pay a separate premium for this coverage. Lowincome beneficiaries are also eligible for a subsidy to help cover the Part D premium, deductible and copayments, but this subsidy requires an application that is separate from Part D enrollment. Part D and the accompanying low-income subsidy therefore required most eligible beneficiaries to make a series of active decisions in order to take up benefits.
How successfully did elderly Medicare beneficiaries navigate the complex set of choices presented by Part D? In particular, we are interested in whether beneficiaries took up benefits that were available to them. Understanding takeup is interesting for at least three reasons. First, we want to know whether these benefits are reaching the individuals they are intended to help. Second, low rates of takeup may suggest costs of enrolling that reduce the value of the program even for those who enroll. In the words of Blundell et al. (1988) : "the existence of non-take-up also suggests that there are costs associated with claiming, which not only deter non-claimants but also partly offset the value of benefits to those who do claim." Third, the underlying "managed competition" framework of the Part D program, in which individuals choose private insurance plans in a regulated and subsidized market, forms the basis for many proposals to expand health insurance coverage in the under-65 population as well. 1 The primary alternative framework for policies to expand coverage is one in which government functions as insurer, like Part A of the Medicare program. The success or failure of Part D becomes, in effect, an important test case for the potential of market-based reforms relying on private plans and individual choices to expand insurance coverage.
A priori, there is considerable reason to expect low takeup of both Part D and the associated subsidy. Takeup of most social benefits is low (for a review, see Currie 2004) .
Moreoever, the tasks required of prospective Part D enrollees -who in most cases had to decide not only whether to take up the program but also had to choose a plan from a menu of complicated options -are considerably more complex than deciding whether or not take up programs like SSI or Food Stamps. Medicare beneficiares may be particularly ill-suited to tackle these complex decisions because many of them have aging-related cognitive limitations. The difficulties associated with the introduction of Medicare HMOs in 1997, which were initially unpopular with enrollees, is a discouraging example of how such a scenario might play out.
In this paper, we present evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which suggests that in spite of all of these challenges, takeup of Part D among elderly
Medicare beneficiaries was relatively high, and that most beneficiaries made good decisions about which they felt confident. Takeup of the subsidy program, on the other hand, seems to have been low even compared with the low rates of takeup for other social programs. Here, lack of information seems to have been a factor. Many respondents reported that they did not apply because they had not heard of the program and many more gave responses suggesting that they were confused about the subsidy. Although running the subsidy application process through SSA may have reduced stigma, and was administratively simpler because in most cases Part D premiums were paid by deduction from Social Security payments, it may have added to the cognitive demands.
Despite the apparent low take-up of the low-income subsidy, there is no apparent difference in Part D coverage between the subsidy-eligible and other groups, even when
Medicaid recipients are set aside. That is, the fraction of seniors who have no drug coverage is about the same at all income levels. Thus, it appears that low-income groups did navigate the program and are receiving the benefits of the heavily subsidized insurance of Part D, but are not fully benefiting from the extra help available to them.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the relevant institutional features of the Part D benefit and the associated low-income subsidy. Section 3 discusses the literature on economic models of program takeup. Section 4 discusses the HRS data available for evaluating takeup of Part D and the subsidy and how we define key variables for our analysis. Section 5 presents descriptive and multivariate results, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results.
Background on Part D and the Low-Income Subsidy
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 established the prescription drug benefit known as "Part D," which is administered by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). In addition, the Act also established a means-tested subsidy to help cover premiums, deductibles and copayments for beneficiaries with low incomes and few assets. The application and approval process for the low-income subsidy (referred to as "extra help" in the public information campaign) is handled by SSA. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that about 1/3 of Medicare beneficiaries would qualify for the means-tested subsidy, which, if used, would represent about a 20% increase in income for those at the poverty level (CBO, 2004) Medicare beneficiaries were affected very differently by Part D and the subsidy depending on what their prior prescription drug insurance was.
• Individuals with "other creditable coverage" -that is, insurance coverage with actuarial value greater than or equal to the standard Part D plan -were instructed to keep that coverage. This was, for the most part, employersponsored group coverage, and those employers received a subsidy from the government to continue offering it.
• Medicaid-covered Medicare beneficiaries ("dual eligibles") were automatically enrolled in both Part D and the subsidy.
• Medicare Advantage plans (HMOs), many of which were already providing drug coverage prior to 2006, essentially had to offer drug coverage under Part D, so that Medicare HMO enrollees were more or less assured of participating in Part D. 2 Medicare HMO enrollees interested in applying for the subsidy had to make a separate application to SSA including information on income and assets.
• Individuals with privately purchased prescription drug insurance or with no coverage for prescription drugs had to decide whether they wanted to enroll in Part D and if so choose a plan and sign up for it. 3 They also had the option of enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan-many of which were marketed by the same companies as stand-alone Part D plans. If they wanted to apply for the subsidy they had to make a separate application including information on income and assets to SSA.
In effect, then, individuals with privately purchased drug coverage and individuals with no drug coverage had to decide whether or not to sign up for Part D and whether or not to apply for the subsidy; Medicare HMO enrollees had to decide only whether or not to apply for the subsidy. Individuals with employer-sponsored coverage had no decisions to make. Medicaid/Medicare dual eligibles could either do nothing and be automatically enrolled in both a Part D plan and the subsidy, or they could actively choose a plan and switch into it from the one to which they had been automatically assigned.
Eligibility for the subsidy is based on beneficiaries' income and assets. Individuals with incomes below 135 percent of the poverty level and assets below $6,000 for singles or $10,000 for couples were eligible for a full subsidy in 2006. A partial subsidy was available for individuals with incomes up to 150 percent of the poverty level and assets below $9,000 for singles or $20,000 for couples. The definition of income used for eligibility differs from that used to calculate poverty levels because it excludes some types of income. Specifically, the income of other household members is not counted, and the poverty thresholds for one and two-person households apply for single and married individuals. In addition, the first $240 of annual income is disregarded; the first $720 of annual earnings and half of all earnings above that level is also disregarded. 3. Economic models of program take-up. Moffitt (1983) is considered the starting point of modern economic models of program take-up. He used a simple utility-maximizing framework to incorporate both the magnitude of potential benefits and the costs of enrollment and participation. He focused in particular on "stigma"-psychic costs associated with means-tested welfare programs.
Subsequent research has found pure stigma effects to be relatively unimportant, while transactions costs-the time spent navigating the system-can be quite significant (see Part D is different in that it also has a direct financial cost: the premium the beneficiary must pay. For some fraction of the eligible population, the premium exceeds the individual's expected benefit from the program, so that individuals may quite reasonably decide not to participate. In particular, individuals with low expected total prescription drug spending should not take up the plan because they would pay more in premiums than they would get in benefits. Winter et al. (2006a) 
Remember, as Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Leavitt says, "If in doubt, fill it out!"
Nonetheless, existing research suggests that the elderly take up other means-tested social programs at particularly low rates; see, for example analyses of Food Stamps by Haider et al. (2003) , of Medicaid by (Pezzin and Kasper (2000) , and of SSI by McGarry (1995) and by Powers (2004, 2006) . These results suggest that takeup of the LowIncome Subsidy is likely to be low.
Data.
The Health 
4A. Defining respondents' prescription drug insurance coverage
In the 2004 HRS, respondents had as many as three opportunities to provide information about insurance coverage for prescribed medicines:
• Respondents with Medicare or Medicaid insurance coverage are asked if they get these benefits through an HMO. If they do, they are asked whether the Medicare/Medicaid HMO covers prescription drugs (and other questions about that HMO).
• For up to three private insurance plans, respondents report the source of coverage (own employer, spouse's employer, privately purchased, etc.) and whether or not the plan covers prescription drugs.
• In the section on utilization of medical care, all respondents are asked whether they regularly take any prescription medications. If they do, they are asked "Have the costs of your prescription medications been completely covered by health insurance, mostly covered, only partially covered, or not covered at all by insurance?"
Respondents who do not regularly take any prescription drugs are asked whether they have insurance coverage that would cover the cost of drugs if they took any. All respondents are asked to provide the name of the plan that covers or would cover prescription drug expenses.
The 2006 Based on this information, we assign respondents prescription drug coverage in the following hierarchical order (that is, if a respondent reports more than on of these types of coverage, s/he is assigned the first one in this list): 
4B. Data on takeup of the low-income subsidy
In 2006 
4C. Other variables Prescription drug use 2004:
In the 2004 core survey, respondents are asked whether they take medication to treat high blood pressure, diabetes, heart conditions (AMI, angina, congestive heart failure), stroke, or psychiatric conditions. We use the number of conditions for which medications are taken (0-5) in 2004 as a measure of demand for prescription drugs.
Prescription drug use 2006:
In the 2006 core survey, respondents are asked whether they take medication to treat high blood pressure, diabetes, heart conditions (AMI, angina, congestive heart failure), stroke, or psychiatric conditions, and in addition whether they take prescription drugs for pain, allergy/asthma, GI problems, cholesterol, sleep aid, or anxiety/depression. We use the number of conditions for which medications are taken (0-11) in 2006 as a measure of demand for prescription drugs. This has obvious potential endogeneity problems. However, the fact that Part D offered insurance to everyone actually lessens the endogeneity problems of prior drug use, which was strongly conditioned on the unequal availability of insurance. In work not reported here, we have found that the number of medications reported in late 2005 in a separate mail survey prior to Part D shows results very similar to this.
Subsidy eligibility: Eligibility for the low-income subsidy is based on the rules described above. Using detailed HRS data on 2005 income and assets, which are reported in the 2006 core survey, we are able to follow the eligibility rules quite closely in order to construct measures of countable income and assets for purposes of determining eligibility.
Cognition: In the HRS core survey, interviewers read a list of ten words to respondents, who then recall as many words as they can. They are asked to recall the words immediately after hearing the list and also several minutes later. We use the sum of these from the 2006 survey, ranging from 0 to 20, as an indicator of cognitive ability. Many respondents who have difficulty with this task refuse to complete it and have missing data as a result, so we treat missing data as a separate category for this variable.
Health: Respondents report their own health status as excellent, very good, good, fair, poor in every wave of the HRS core. We use data on self-reported health in 2004.
Education: Respondents are classified into four groups based on their reported educational attainment at the baseline interview: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate or more.
Demographic variables:
We also include race (white, black, other nonwhite), ethnicity (Hispanic, non-Hispanic), marital status and age as explanatory variables in our analysis. Overall, 28 percent of respondents report that they are in fair or poor health. Twothirds of them take medication to treat one or more of high blood pressure, diabetes, heart conditions (AMI, angina, congestive heart failure), stroke, or psychiatric conditions. Better-off households are much more likely to have employer coverage, which covers 41.5 percent of the richest group compared to only 21.2 percent of subsidy-eligible respondents. Medicaid covers almost as many subsidy-eligible respondents as employer coverage (19.7 percent) but almost none of the richer respondents. These differences by income offset each other so that the fraction with no coverage is about 7 or 8 percent in each group. That is, rich and poor elderly individuals are equally likely to lack prescription drug coverage.
Results
Very few respondents reported that they had applied for the SSA low-income subsidy. Only 13 percent of respondents with stand-alone Part D coverage reported having done so (Table 3) , with about half of these reporting that they had gotten the subsidy. Subsidy application rates were about 9 to 10 percent among respondents whom we categorize as close to the eligibility threshold, and were negligible (2 percent) among respondents who reported both income and assets high enough to disqualify them from eligibility. Subsidy applications appear to have been slightly less likely from Medicare HMO enrollees but because of the high rate of missing data discussed above we cannot say conclusively how their takeup rate compares to that for beneficiaries in stand-alone Part D plans. Table 4 shows the distribution of outcomes by subsidy eligibility status that these conditional takeup rates imply.
Although precise comparisons will require age-specific administrative data and sampling weights for the HRS 2006 sample, it is clear from these counts that reported applications and receipt of the low-income subsidy in HRS are low relative to published administrative estimates. According to GAO, applications represented about 14% of the number of Medicare beneficiaries, and the approval rate was about one-third of that, so about 5% of Medicare beneficiaries have LIS approval. By contrast, only about 3% of older Medicare beneficiaries in HRS even reported an application. A higher rate, about half, report approval, but the count of approved beneficiaries is still far lower than administrative estimates. This shortfall is much too large to be explained by the change in skip patterns. It must be the case that some people who receive the low-income subsidy nevertheless answered no to the question about applying to Social Security for extra help.
One indication that this may be so is the number of people without the subsidy who report paying nothing in premiums. A likely explanation is that people filled out the subsidy application at the same time as they signed up for Part D and did not consider the two to be separate actions but rather all part of Part D. Future work will attempt to identify which of the non-reporters may actually be covered. Ultimately, administrative linkages to SSA and CMS data should permit a definitive answer.
Defining takeup
Our aim is to study takeup as an economic behavior, i.e. program we might want to count Medicaid recipients as well, even though they have no active takeup decision to make since they were automatically enrolled in Part D. Table 5 lists seven possible definitions of Part D takeup and nine possible definitions of takeup for the "Extra Help" subsidy. The last column of the table shows the sample size in the denominator of the fraction for each takeup calculation. In the multivariate analysis that follows I will present results for all of these outcomes. Table 6 income or asset gradient in takeup. 8 Thus, it appears that Part D takeup was driven mostly by demand for prescription drugs, although there is also evidence that individuals with 8 In results not reported here, we estimated regression which break up all of the continuous variables into sets of dummies (for example self-reported health becomes a set of four dummies instead of a linear variable with values 1-5). This does reveal some nonlinearities in the effect of covariates, but overall the results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported here.
better cognitive functioning (memory) were more likely to sign up. We plan to investigate this result further in the future using additional detailed data from the HRS on other dimensions of cognition, such as numeracy. 
Why do people say they didn't sign up?
Respondents' own stated reasons for not signing up for Part D or the subsidy may be at least as illuminating as the multivariate regression results. Table 9 Table 9 . The entries for these categories are sample sizes in each cell rather than cell fractions to emphasize the fact that there are very few responses in any one of these categories. Table 9 shows that as you might expect, about two-thirds of all respondents with privately purchased coverage in 2006 report that they did not sign up for Part D because they already have coverage. Very few (2.3 percent) chose the response "I didn't know it was available;" a few (6.2 percent) didn't sign up because they do not use any prescription drugs. The detailed analysis of the text responses for respondents with privately purchased coverage offers little evidence to support the view that people did not sign up because they were unaware of the program or confused. Table 9 also shows responses to "why didn't you sign up?" for respondents whom we classified as having no prescription drug coverage. Eleven percent of these respondents report that they did not sign up for Part D because they already had good coverage, raising concern about measurement error in our drug coverage variable. Very few uninsured respondents say they did not know about the plan (1.4 percent) or heard about it too late (1.9 percent). A significant fraction (12.9 percent) report not having There is more evidence that confusion and, especially, lack of information help explain why respondents did not apply for the subsidy. Table 10 presents a tabulation of respondent reasons why they did not sign up; as in Table 9 , options 1 through 6 were presented to respondents as a menu of reasons for not signing up, while options 7A through 7F were based on text responses recorded by interviewers and analyzed by an undergraduate research assistant. We report these responses for those with Medicare HMO coverage and Part D coverage, both overall and only for those whom we classify as subsidy-eligible. A quarter of respondents overall and 36 percent of subsidy-eligible respondents report that they did not apply for the subsidy because they did not know about it. Fully 41 percent of subsidy-eligible respondents in stand-alone Part D plans report not having known about the subsidy.
How difficult was the decision?
The Part D plan was introduced to apparently widespread confusion and predictions that the elderly would be unable to make good decisions given such complex choices. In spite of this expectation, only about one in six respondents reports that the decision was "very" or "somewhat" difficult (Table 11 ). The remainder reported that it was not very difficult or not at all difficult, or that they did not make the decision themselves (someone else chose for them or they were automatically enrolled). 9 -Enrollees in stand-alone Part D plans did have more difficulty than the other groups; 36 percent of them reported a decision that was very or somewhat difficult. But even for this group -and significantly, even for Part D enrollees with very poor memory scores, less than half found the decision difficult.
Moreover, the majority (69 percent) of Part D plan enrollees reported feeling "very confident" or "somewhat confident" about having made the right decision, and 86 percent of them planned to sign up again the following year. Those who did not enroll mostly did not plan to sign up the following year (21.4 percent of those with privately purchased coverage and 34.6 percent of those with no coverage).
Discussion and conclusion
We emphasize that this research is at a very preliminary stage. Our results suggest 
